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Compacts of Free Association-type Agreements:  
A Life Preserver for Small Island Sovereignty in an 
Era of Climate Change? 
by Philip G. Dabbagh* 
Abstract 
One of the most existential threats posed by climate change is the threat 
posed to the number of small island states scattered around the world’s oceans.  
Given the fact that many of these countries are low-lying and have average 
elevations in the single digit of meters, sea level rise of even a few meters over the 
coming decades and centuries runs the risk of completely submerging many of 
these islands, and in the process, extinguishing their sovereignty as nation states.  
Since traditional notions of statehood require an element of territoriality, as first 
defined in Article 1 of the 1933 Treaty of Montevideo,1 we may be forced to 
redefine what constitutes a “state” for the purposes of international relations.  This 
paper will focus primarily on the issue of state sovereignty as it applies to small 
island states in a time of climate change and sea level rise.  In addition, it will 
address and critique some of the potential solutions to the issue of sovereignty of 
small island states.  Finally, it will advance a proposal that a new series of bilateral 
treaties, based upon the Compacts of Free Association (CFAs) between the United 
States and three Pacific Ocean island states, the Federated States of Micronesia, 
the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau (the Compact 
States) could strike the best balance between the protection of these states’ 
sovereignty, the preservation of their political and cultural independence, and 
providing for the necessary resources and infrastructure to allow these states to 
continue to exist as distinct entities in the international community. 
 
Introduction 
Climate change is considered one of the gravest threats to a number of small 
island states scattered across the world.  Given the silence of international law on 
what happens to a state if it loses its entire territory due to climate change, there is 
no established plan for how these countries will continue to exist as sovereign 
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entities should sea levels continue to rise at their current rates and cause these 
island territories to become submerged.  A further question remains as to how the 
island states most threatened by climate change will be able to adapt to rising sea 
levels while maintaining their sovereign personality, their economic vitality, and 
their cultural and political autonomy.  Beyond these concerns, there is also an issue 
of what gaps exist in current international legal instruments and what instruments 
need to adapt to these circumstances to maximize the potential of these island states 
to not only survive rising sea levels, but thrive in the new environment. 
One potential solution that could facilitate the survival and adaptation of the 
island states most threatened by rising sea levels involves the development of 
bilateral treaties between these nations and more developed nations.  Such bilateral 
treaty structures can be modelled on the extant “Compacts of Free Association” 
that are in force between the United States and three Pacific island states: The 
Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) 
and the Republic of Palau (hereinafter, the “Compact States”).  Such treaties would 
create a structure that would allow developed nations to shoulder the financial and 
technical burdens to protect the territoriality and sovereignty of these island states.  
This paper will argue that such treaties can facilitate the survival of states 
threatened by rising sea levels through land reclamation and other “island 
hardening” infrastructure projects that many of these nations would not ordinarily 
be able to afford, given their economic situations.  Furthermore, these treaty 
structures allow for the possibility for developed nations—many of which emitted 
large amounts of the greenhouse gases responsible for the problems faced by these 
island nations—to help shoulder the financial burdens faced by these smaller 
nations in the decades ahead. 
The discussion of the threat posed to small island nations by rising sea levels 
is not by any means new, and the potential effects of sea level rise on island nations 
have been recognized and discussed for almost three decades.  In 1989, President 
of the Marshall Islands, Amata Kabua, stated the issue succinctly: 
 
It is truly frightening to think that our ocean will turn against us.  We 
have been sustained by the ocean for two millennia. . . .  We have 
learned that this harmony may be interrupted by the action of nations 
very distant from our shores.  I hope that the appeal of the peoples of 
the Pacific can help convince the industrialized nations to discontinue 
their profligate contamination of the atmosphere.2   
 
However, even though climate change and the prospect of rising sea levels 
has become more accepted and the need for action more urgent, there are no 
existing proposals that completely solve the threat posed by rising sea levels to 
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these island nations’ respective sovereignty.3  Indeed, there is the potential that 
these nations could be completely submerged over time, placing climate change as 
not just a costly burden to these nations, but as an existential threat.  Currently, 
there are no clear routes about how these nations will adapt to rising sea levels, 
either in terms of how they are represented in the international community or how 
they will survive and exist in a potentially “post-submerged” state.4  Besides the 
loss of sovereignty, many of these nations also face threats to their ability to have 
an effective economy due to the loss of territory of smaller outlying islands, as well 
as the rights these nations once held to their territorial seas and their Exclusive 
Economic Zones (EEZs), as defined by the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS).5  Since many of these outlying areas are at risk of 
submerging under rising sea levels within a matter of decades, immediate action 
needs to be taken in order to preserve these areas, and by extension, these nations’ 
territorial seas and exclusive economic zones. 
This paper will discuss the overall nature of the problem of rising sea levels 
and the effects upon some of the island nations most at risk to rising sea levels.  In 
addition, this paper will examine several of potential means of addressing rising 
sea levels, both from the perspective of actual physical adaptations (artificial land 
similar to the islands created in the South China Sea, or floating islands), as well 
as legal instruments meant to ensure the long-term survival of the nation states 
themselves in the event that they become submerged and lose their entire landmass.  
The potential solutions discussed include (but are not limited to) the evolution into 
nations “in exile” and the as of yet theoretical entity called the nation “ex-situ.”  
Each of these proposals will also be critiqued in terms of the solutions they purport 
to solve and other issues that arise in the event of their implementation.  Finally, 
this paper will focus on a new solution to address the issues faced by small 
underdeveloped islands nations, and will seek to show that an already existing 
treaty structure (namely, the Compact of Free Association) can be utilized as a 
model between developed nations and small island states in order to establish a line 
of aid by which these developing nations can fund and assist in developing the 
infrastructure necessary to adapt to rising sea levels, while maintaining their 
political independence, their territoriality, as well as their societal and cultural 
autonomy. 
 
The Threat of Climate Change 
Since the First Assessment Report to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), the IPCC has anticipated at least a sea-level rise of about 0.3-0.5 
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meters by 2050 and about 1 meter by 2100, together with a rise in the temperature 
of the surface ocean layer of between 0.2°C and 2.5°C.6  The updated Fifth 
Assessment Report, as applied to small islands, states that sea level rise, in 
conjunction with other “high-water events,” will threaten low-lying coastal areas 
with a high degree of confidence by the time period between the years 2080-2100.7  
Even though the estimates for sea level rise are projected to be one meter by the 
year 2100 at an average rate of between 2.8 millimeters and 3.6 millimeters per 
year since 1993,8 these numbers tell only a part of the story.  Further research 
indicates that the rate at which sea level rise is occurring varies in different oceans.  
In particular, in the western tropical Pacific region, sea level rise is estimated to be 
“at a rate up to 3–4 times larger than the global mean between 1993 and 2010” 
according to satellite altimetry data.9  It is with this data in mind that the Fifth 
Assessment Report to the IPCC stated that it is virtually certain that global mean 
sea level rises are accelerating and that it presents a particular threat to small islands 
due to particular vulnerabilities brought about by different stressors.10  The 
stressors mentioned by the IPCC include the degradation of fresh water resources, 
the prospect of reef bleaching, and sea flood and erosion risks.11 
 
Issues Faced by Small Island States Due to Climate Change 
While many nations will be affected by the prospect of climate change in one 
manner or another, low-lying island nations are uniquely susceptible to these 
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effects of climate change compared to larger “continental” nations.  These issues 
manifest themselves in three distinct areas: first, in the increasingly ephemeral 
nature of the territory and Exclusive Economic Zones of these nations, which will 
disappear under rising sea levels; second, in the financial challenges already faced 
by these small island states, many of which are particularly underdeveloped 
compared to many other nations; and third, the existential threat to the sovereignty 
of these nations, due to the idea under customary international law that nation-
states must possess territory, and the lack of action in the international arena in 
defining the role of a sovereign state that does not include the aspect of 
territoriality.  Underscoring these points is the irony that these nations are among 
the nations least responsible for the emission of greenhouse gases into the 
atmosphere, but nevertheless will be among the first to suffer the horrifying 




The basis for much of the territorial claims of states in and around bodies of 
water are governed under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS).  For example, under UNCLOS, Article 121, islands are defined as 
such: 
An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, 
which is above water at high tide.  
Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the 
contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental 
shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions 
of this Convention applicable to other land territory.  
Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of 
their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental 
shelf.13 
 
However, another part of the Convention distinguishes between islands, 
under Article 121, and so-called “low tide elevations” under Article 13, which are 
defined as follows: 
A low-tide elevation is a naturally formed area of land which is 
surrounded by and above water at low tide but submerged at high 
tide.  Where a low-tide elevation is situated wholly or partly at a 
distance not exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the 
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mainland or an island, the low-water line on that elevation may be 
used as the baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea.  
Where a low-tide elevation is wholly situated at a distance 
exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland or an 
island, it has no territorial sea of its own.14 
 
Here, the application of Article 13 as applied to lower-lying islands would 
begin to have a dramatic effect on the territory of these island states, even assuming 
that more populated landforms will remain above sea level.  If and when certain 
low-lying islands situated at the outer fringes of these nations’ territories become 
“demoted” to low-tide elevations, Article 13(2) of UNCLOS states that they will 
lose the territorial seas that were formerly a part of the that state.  For many of these 
nations, it is not a matter of these territorial seas reverting to the sovereignty of 
neighboring nations, but rather, would revert to the state of being “high seas,” 
which are defined as, “all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive 
economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the 
archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State.”15 
In addition to the loss of territorial seas, the loss of territorial waters due to 
rising sea levels also impacts the extent of these nations’ Exclusive Economic 
Zones (EEZs).  For many of these nations, the EEZ provides valuable resources for 
these countries, due to the grant in UNCLOS of the sovereign right “of exploring 
and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or 
non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil 
. . . .”16  With the regression of coastal baselines because of sea level rise, the end 
result of landmasses devolving from islands to low-tide elevations (if not complete 
submersion) as a result of climate change is not just the loss of territorial seas 
themselves, but the EEZs which are measured off of existing baselines17  Once the 
Exclusive Economic Zone of a nation vanishes, the waters are then considered 
“high seas”18 under Part VII of UNCLOS, and bestows upon all states the right to, 
among other thing, the freedom of constructing “artificial islands and other 
installations permitted under international law”19 as well as “the freedom of 
 
 14. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 13, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
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1833 U.N.T.S. 432. 
 19. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 87(1)(d), Dec. 10, 1982, 
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fishing[.]”20  The acute nature of the loss of the resources provided by EEZs are 
discussed further in the next section.  
Beyond the loss of territorial seas and EEZs, sea level rise, if it was to 
continue unabated, would have dire consequences on the existence of many of the 
islands that make up most of these countries.  The Republic of Maldives for 
example, in the Indian Ocean, has a mean elevation of just 1.7 meters above sea 
level (its highest point, the eighth tee of a golf course located on Villingi Island, is 
just five meters above sea level).21  In comparison, the Republic of Kiribati, in the 
Pacific Ocean, has a mean elevation of just two meters above sea level.22  Other 
island nations in the Pacific are similarly situated, including Tuvalu (average 
elevation of two meters)23 and the Marshall Islands (average elevation of two 
meters).24  It becomes very clear that if the sea-level rise predictions of the IPCC’s 
Fifth Assessment Report come to fruition, large portions of the landmasses for 
these island states will become submerged below rising sea levels, resulting in the 




Compounding the issues faced by island states as a result of climate change 
is twofold in terms of the financial difficulties.  First, the lack of international law 
in preventing the loss of Exclusive Economic Zones would disproportionately 
impact the ability of these nations to fund their own governance and local economy.  
Second, a further obstacle for these nations arise in the removal of previously 
available resources in former EEZs to develop and maintain the infrastructure 
meant to preserve existing shorelines and territory and to prevent flooding and 
inundation of their existing landmasses without large scale foreign aid.   
One example of the potential economic impacts of these nations stems from 
just the potential loss of EEZs as a result of sea level rise turning landmasses from 
islands to low-tide elevations, if not the complete submergence of the land mass.  
To stress the relative import of the Exclusive Economic Zones, the Republic of 
Kiribati has a landmass of only 811 square kilometers, roughly comparable to 
 
 20. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 87(1)(e), Dec. 10, 1982, 
1833 U.N.T.S. 432. 
 21. Maldives, The World Factbook, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www. 
cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-worldfactbook/geos/mv.html (last visited Nov. 
10, 2017) [https://perma.cc/6ABZ-DELZ]. 
 22. Kiribati, The World Factbook, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www. 
cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kr.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2017) 
[https://perma.cc/K9W6-UFMM]. 
 23. Tuvalu, The World Factbook, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www. 
cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tv.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2017) 
[https://perma.cc/F99K-8HA7]. 
 24. Marshall Islands, The World Factbook, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rm.html (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2017) [https://perma.cc/4DV5-4GQ5]. 
 





about four times the size of Washington, D.C.25  Its Exclusive Economic Zone, 
however, totals approximately 3.5 million square kilometers,26 roughly one-third 
the total land area of the United States.27  This Exclusive Economic Zone is of great 
importance to Kiribati, and is largely responsible for supporting the national 
economy, due to the fact that half of the government budget is funded from the 
granting of fishing licenses to foreign vessels in the EEZ.28  The Kiribati national 
budget in turn is responsible for more than half of the GDP of the country as of 
2008.29   
This problem of the degradation of EEZs is not limited to just Kiribati, 
however.  Many Pacific island nations, given their relatively small land areas, were 
granted enormous EEZs, along with the wealth they could generate as a result of 
the regime created under UNCLOS, primarily through the valuable fish stocks 
located within these zones.30  The situation with Kiribati is hardly unique, as many 
of these island nations have EEZs ranging from a hundred to a thousand times their 
landmass, a disproportionate scale unlike other countries by virtue of their relative 
remoteness, and the sprawled out nature of their island landmasses.31  While many 
of these nations are relatively poor (GDP per capita for Kiribati, the Solomon 
Islands and Papua New Guinea was less than US$1,000 as of 2008),32 the fees that 
these countries are able to collect from foreign fishing vessels provide a critical 
component to their economies, particularly in light of the fact that many domestic 
fishing industries are unable to take advantage of the potential wealth of their 
respective EEZs.33 
Even though there is the potential for these nations to unlock the wealth 
available from their Exclusive Economic Zones, such potential prosperity is 
diminished with the knowledge that these zones are under threat of receding due 
 
 25. Kiribati, The World Factbook, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www. 
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 28. ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 26. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See R. Hannesson, The Exclusive Economic Zone and Economic Development in 
the Pacific Island Countries, MARINE POLICY 32, 886, 889 (2008) (“The Pacific island 
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resource wealth of the EEZs is the tuna stocks that are located there.”). 
 31. R. Hannesson, The Exclusive Economic Zone and Economic Development in the 
Pacific Island Countries, MARINE POLICY 32, 886, 889 (2008). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 




to climate change.  It is clear that long term sea level rise would have a deleterious 
effect on the outer fringes of these states’ Exclusive Economic Zones, the end result 
being a diminished EEZ, which would have a smaller portion of resources available 
to these nations under Article 56 of UNCLOS.34  The decline in their respective 
EEZs will compound their already precarious financial situation, even without the 
financial impacts of implementing adaptation and mitigation measures to stem the 
effects of climate change. 
While several of these states have already embarked on a course of 
adaptation and mitigation measures to blunt the impact of climate change on their 
respective territory, many of them are faced with the long-term vulnerability of 
being able to continue funding these programs without a substantial infusion of 
long-term aid, most likely through other foreign governments or international 
organizations.  It cannot be stressed enough that the financial resources required to 
adapt to and mitigate the effects of climate change are enormous.  To give an 
example of the costs associated with coastal defenses, Japan spent approximately 
US$200 million in the late 1980s to construct coastal defenses to protect 
Okinotorishima, a small grouping of rocks at the far southern end of its territory in 
an effort to preserve both their EEZ as well as their continental shelf rights.35  
While this is an admittedly extreme example, large-scale efforts would be required 
to preserve the landmasses of many of the islands that make up these nations.  For 
example, in Fanafuti, the main island of Tuvalu, it is estimated that 54 kilometers 
of coastal defenses would be required to be constructed to protect its 2.5 square 
kilometers and 2,700 inhabitants.36   
Some island nations have already begun the process of creating infrastructure 
meant to mitigate the effects of climate change.  The Republic of Maldives, for 
example, has embarked on a “National Adaptation Programme of Action” (NAPA) 
which is meant to “communicate the most urgent and immediate adaptation needs 
of Maldives as stipulated under UNFCCC Decision 28/CP.7.”37  Among the 
projects discussed in NAPA include “Coastal Protection of Safer Islands to Reduce 
the Risk from Sea Induced Flooding and Predicted Sea Level Rise,” estimated to 
cost US$13.9 million,38 the Coastal Protection of Malé International Airport, 
costing an estimated US$18.5 million,39 and a project entitled “Protection of 
human settlements by coastal protection measures on safer islands,” estimated to 
 
 34. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 56(1)(a), Dec. 10, 
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cost US$60.6 million.40  Other projects that Maldives has embarked on include the 
development of coastal protection as a part of its “Safer Islands Strategy,” 
consisting of lining the coastline of certain islands with tetrapod concrete units at 
an estimated cost of US$4,000 per meter.41  
It is apparent that other island nations will face many financial challenges in 
enacting any sort of comprehensive plan to adapt to the reality of climate change 
and sea level rise.  Indeed, in 1990 the IPCC ranked Maldives, Kiribati, Tuvalu, 
Tokelau, Anguilla, Turks and Caicos, Marshall Islands, and Seychelles as among 
the 10 nations with the highest protection costs in relation to GNP.42  In the case 
of Kiribati, coastal protection was estimated in the report to cost approximately 
18% of its annual GNP, while protection for Tuvalu was estimated to cost 
approximately 14% of its annual GNP.43  Even though many of the most vulnerable 
island nations are among the smallest and least populated in the Pacific and Indian 
Ocean regions, even the relatively developed and more populated island nations 
face onerous financial burdens moving forward if they are to adequately address 
the issues posed by climate change.  The Republic of Fiji, for example, is estimated 
to require almost 100% of its GDP in the development of projects meant to 
“strengthen Fiji’s resilience to climate change and natural hazards for the decades 
to come.”44  Even with the high costs associated with these projects meant to adapt 
to the effects of climate change, the current status quo is perhaps even more 
untenable for Fiji, as the fraction of GDP lost every year due to cyclones and floods 
could increase by 50% by the year 2050, equivalent to more than 6.5% of the 
country’s GDP for every year.45 
While the costs of adapting to climate change for these countries are merely 
representative of the individual projects they come from, they also serve as a 
warning for the sheer costs that will occur as the need to adapt to climate change 
becomes all the more apparent and urgent for small island states.  While these costs 
are great, and indeed beyond the resources of many of these countries, such 
expenses may be seen as necessary given the potential for even greater losses due 
to the extinguishing of these countries’ EEZs through the degradation of their outer 
landmasses from islands to low-tide elevations or submerged landmasses without 
the rights of territorial seas or EEZs. 
 
 
 40. Id. 
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As a final matter, there is an even more existential issue faced by these 
nations, beyond the financial burdens and the loss of territoriality.  That is the 
potential loss of total sovereignty of these nations, and the associated geopolitical 
consequences that would flow from the end of their sovereignty.  Currently, there 
is no procedure in international law to account for the abrupt extinguishing of a 
nation’s sovereignty due to climate change.46  Indeed, there are no circumstances 
in international law to account for the possible situation here where no successor 
State exists and the predecessor State has been rendered uninhabitable or has 
physically disappeared.47  This issue stems from the fact that customary law has a 
very discrete definition of what actually constitutes a “state.”  While there was no 
historical definition of a state for the purposes of international law, customary 
international law adopted the definition from the Montevideo Convention on the 
Rights and Duties of States from 1933, which says that states under international 
law should possess the following qualifications: 
(a) A permanent population 
(b) A defined territory 
(c) A government 
(d) The capacity to enter into relations with other states.48 
 
In addition, the United Nations Charter states that membership in that body 
“is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in 
the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing 
to carry out these obligations.”49  While there is no procedure in the charter to allow 
for the withdrawal of member states (to avoid the weaknesses inherent in the 
predecessor League of Nations),50 the question remains unresolved about what 
would happen to a member state which has lost its entire territory.  The potential 
complete loss of a state’s territory could be marked as an inability to carry out the 
obligations of the Charter under Article 4(1) and could potentially be used to expel 
member states, or could force these states to be relegated to a sort of “Observer” 
status.   
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It is precisely these unanswered questions on sovereignty and membership 
in the international community that are the most difficult challenges faced by small 
island states.  While international law has previously provided definitions of what 
a “state” is for the purposes of being able to exercise a sovereign personality, the 
prospect of the end of one of the primary requirements of a state (where states 
possess a territory) is throwing that customary definition into flux.  There is also 
the tension between the ability of island states to maintain their territoriality, 
balanced with the realities of the financial burdens that it would require, balanced 
further with the financial implications of not acting to save their territory, resulting 
in a loss of territorial seas and EEZs.  The financial issues of adapting to and 
mitigating the effects of climate change become more apparent as funding for such 
activities will be taken on by the entire international community.  While global 
investment and involvement is very much needed in these circumstances, this also 
brings a host of issues for island states, which could have deleterious effects long-
term on their sovereignty and national agency. 
It is with these concerns in mind that potential solutions can be categorized 
broadly into two main bodies: the first is the idea of island states having their 
territorial integrity extinguished, but the sovereign nation-state continuing to exist 
as a member of the international community in another capacity, as perhaps a 
nation “in exile” or as a “nation ex-situ.”  Another method of preserving these 
nations’ respective sovereignty comes about as a result of the preservation of their 
territoriality (and by extension, their populations) through some method of 
extensive coastal defenses, land reclamation, or even floating or artificial islands.  
These categories seek to answer the same question through vastly different means, 
and while neither set of approaches is ideal in all respects, they do bring certain 
desirable aspects to the forefront. These methods of preserving island nation 
sovereignty in an age of climate change and rising sea levels will be discussed in 
further detail below. 
 
Non-Territorial-Based Solutions for Threatened Island States 
The “Government in Exile” 
 
While the sovereignty issues faced by island states in light of rising seas 
brought by climate change are unique, there are certain non-territorial based 
solutions to the challenges faced by these countries.  Perhaps the most well-known 
example of a non-territorial based solution to the issue of sovereignty is the concept 
of the “government in exile.”  While there is no fully accepted definition of the 
term “government in exile,” the definition used in this context is: 
[A] government in exile consists of an individual or a group of 
individuals who reside within the territory of a foreign State after 
being forced to leave their homeland due to enemy occupation or 
possibly civil war.  As a result, a government in exile lacks effective 
control over the territory of its State.  Yet it claims to represent the 
will of the people of its homeland and, with the consent of the State 




of residence, asserts and possibly exercises governmental powers.  
The final goal of a government in exile is to (re)gain political power 
in its homeland.51 
 
At several times in recent history, governments in exile have been 
established in a foreign country.  The most prominent examples are from the 
Second World War, when several governments from the nations of Belgium, 
Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Yugoslavia 
established themselves in London as a result of occupation by the Axis powers.52  
Even though these nations’ respective territories (and most of their populations) 
were under the control of a foreign power, these governments in exile were 
recognized by the British Government, with Parliament according their members 
diplomatic privileges and immunities to the members of these governments in 
1941.53 
Since the Second World War, other nations’ legal personalities have faced 
issues of recognition from time to time.  Some of the more notable postwar 
examples include the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia during the Cold 
War (after their annexation by the Soviet Union), and the nation of Kuwait, when 
it was invaded and occupied by Iraq in 1990-91.54  However, these examples do 
tend to share a common thread of belligerent occupation and illegal annexation in 
violation of the prohibition of the use of force.55  These violations of one nation’s 
sovereignty by another through the unlawful use of force can be seen as violations 
of jus cogens norms of international law.56  In these historical cases, violations of 
these norms, such as the waging of aggressive war and annexation resulting from 
an unlawful use of force allow for the continued recognition of the legal personality 
these occupied or annexed States.57 
Similar to the examples of invasion and forceful annexation, a strain of 
thought lends itself to having climate change and the potential effects on threatened 
island States as a jus cogens violation of international law.  These potential 
violations arise as a result of the fundamental international norms that would be 
affected by the disappearance of an island State.58  Such fundamental norms that 
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would be affected by sea level rise and the loss of territory can include the right to 
self-determination and the right to dispose of their natural wealth,59  which are 
rights granted to all peoples in both the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights60 as well as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights.61  If sea level rise was to continue unabated, one obvious 
consequences would be the loss of each nation’s EEZ through the submergence of 
their outermost islands.  A loss of the natural resources inherent in these lost EEZs 
and territorial waters could constitute a jus cogens violation of international law.62  
The International Court of Justice has gone so far as to recognize the idea of 
permanent sovereignty over international resources as a principle of customary 
international law.63  Furthermore, the failure of the international community to 
make meaningful contributions towards reducing emissions could be seen as a 
breach of peremptory norms that are affected by threatened island States.64  Even 
though traditional violations of international norms were based on the more direct 
action of one State against another, the similar consequences that would result to 
these threatened island States such as the loss of natural resources and the potential 
loss of sovereignty do lend credence to the idea of these island states continuing to 
be recognized internationally as nations in exile.  
Even if anthropogenic climate change were to be considered a jus cogens 
violation of international norms that would allow for governments in exile to be 
established and recognized in a manner similar to other historical examples, 
practical considerations of maintaining the effectiveness and legitimacy of a 
government in exile begin to occur.  Such concerns, especially in the context of 
climate change and the timescales involved, become more apparent.  Historical 
governments in exile were always based in the notion that the territory was still 
extant, but physically occupied by another power.  By contrast, the threat posed to 
island nations is very different, as it is the product of sea level rise rather than 
aggressive war.  The idea of governments in exile being occupied by another state 
also relates to a more cognizable temporal function.  The periods of these 
governments existing ranged from several months for Kuwait, to several years for 
the European states during the Second World War, to the multi-decade exile 
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governments of the Baltic States.65  However, despite the length of time involved, 
the return of these governments to their territory was either by the same population 
who was exiled in the first place, or within a generation or two.   
One of the intractable issues that arises in an application of the “government 
in exile” arrangement to these threatened island states is not legal, but temporal.  
While there is the possibility that greenhouse gas concentrations could decline in 
the future, causing a lowering of the sea levels, potentially leading to a 
reemergence of these islands, there is a great uncertainty in sea levels lowering to 
the point that habitation on these islands would be feasible.66  From a practical 
standpoint, it seems difficult to comprehend a government in exile being able to 
effectively serve as a sovereign representative of a population and submerged 
territory.  While similar arguments could be made that several nations on Earth 
have histories that span millennia (including Egypt and China),67 these areas 
always had a fairly cognizable, geographically static population and a tangible 
physical territory that their population could inhabit.   
Conversely, the inhabitants of these threatened island states would have no 
possible recourse to maintain such a coherent identity barring a wholesale 
resettlement scheme on another territory.  While the idea of entire island states 
moving to another land to start over may seem extreme, such courses of action are 
under serious consideration.  Some island nations have already begun the purchase 
of land in other countries for the purposes of resettling their population, such as 
Kiribati, which has purchased twenty square kilometers of land in Fiji for potential 
resettlement.68  However, finding land to permanently settle on, as Kiribati is 
doing, is a solution fraught with challenges.  First and foremost is, of course, 
funding the purchase of suitable land for resettling an entire nation’s population69  
Additionally, such resettlement schemes may encroach on existing populations 
living on those lands, raising the potential for their own displacement.70 
 
 65. Id. at 74, 75. 
 66. Lilian Yamamoto & Miguel Esteban, Atoll Island States and Climate Change: 
Sovereignty Implications, in UNU-IAS Working Paper No. 166 41–42 (2011) (“Even 
though emissions would be reduced to zero at the year 2100 it would take 100 to 400 years 
(according to different models) for CO2 concentrations to drop from their maximum range 
(650 to 700 ppm) to double their pre-industrial level (560 ppm, which is still much higher 
than the present of around 400 ppm).”); see also Gerald A. Meehl, et al., 2007 Global 
Climate Projections, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS: 
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 747, 825 (2007), http://www.ipcc.ch 
/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4_wg1_full_report.pdf. 
 67. Yamamoto & Esteban, supra note 66 (“Although these possibilities and time-
scales appear pointless in the mind of the lifetime of individual human beings, several 
nations on Earth (such as China and Egypt) have a history that spans millennia.”). 
 68. Laurence Caramel, Besieged by the Rising Tides of Climate Change, Kiribati Buys 
Land in Fiji, THE GUARDIAN (June 30, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/environ 
ment/2014/jul/01/kiribati-climate-change-fiji-vanua-levu [https://perma.cc/CGR3-MLWR]. 
 69. Id. (“The Church of England has sold a stretch of land mainly covered by dense 
forest for $8.77m.”). 
 70. Skepticism over Kiribati Purchase of Fiji Land, RADIO NEW ZEALAND (Jan. 13, 
2016), http://www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/294009/skepticism-over-kiriba 
 





One final offshoot of the nation in exile proposal that warrants mention is a 
proposal floated by Tuvalu to Australia in 2009 for a mass resettlement scheme of 
the small island nation.71  The proposal involves moving the entire island nation’s 
10,000 inhabitants to land in Australia, whereby that nation would continue to act 
as a sovereign entity in its own right (maintaining a seat and vote at the United 
Nations).72  Like a nation in exile, Tuvalu would exist in Australia with the ultimate 
intention of returning back to its island should conditions allow for it.73  This 
arrangement also operates under the assumption that it would also be able to 
maintain its EEZ (estimated at around one million square kilometers74), but no 
provision is mentioned as to how this EEZ would be enforced.   
Regardless of the ultimate solution made for threatened island States, there 
does appear to be merit in the idea of freezing of Exclusive Economic Zones as a 
means of supporting its continued sovereign existence.75  Indeed, it may be worth 
examining additional protocols to UNCLOS to provide for the “locking in” of 
EEZs for small island States, in addition to other measures that are devised to 
protect their sovereignty at-large.  However, barring some sort of compelling 
reason for nations such as Australia to effectively “cede” sovereignty of their own 
territory, actual territorial cessions by existing nations for small island states could 
be politically infeasible in the ceding countries.  Depending on where such 
territorial entities are created, they run the risk of causing further displacement of 
local populations.  Even if there could theoretically be a high degree of 
international pressure for highly polluting countries such as the United States or 
Australia to acquiesce to such territorial cessions, any government which would 
agree to such an arrangement would ultimately be subject to the democratic 
accountability of their local electorates.  Furthermore, such cessions of territory to 
different populations could be opposed by other states as well, merely due to the 
precedential value it could have regarding their own respective territorial integrity 
in the future. 
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The Nation “Ex-Situ” 
 
One unique proposal for addressing the issue of state sovereignty among 
island states comes from Professor Maxine Burkett, who proposes an entirely new 
category of nationhood, the Nation “Ex-Situ.”76  While Professor Burkett’s 
proposal covers an article in and of itself, the basic outline of the theoretical Nation 
“Ex-Situ” is as follows: as sea levels continue rising and threaten the territory and 
population of these island states, the United Nations Trusteeship system would be 
reestablished in a modified form to act as a continuity of the threatened states and 
to preserve the sovereign equality of these states.77  Specifically, the UN 
trusteeship system that was in place after the Second World War is utilized as the 
model since it serves to “demonstrate the viability of this kind of removed 
governance and provides a structure that the international community can most 
easily replicate given earlier experiences.”78  One key difference from previous 
trusteeship arrangements however, is that instead of the historical arrangement of 
a state, a group of states, of the United Nations holding the territory in trust, the 
new system proposed here would be marked by the UN’s comparative absence in 
structuring the internal arrangement of the trusteeship arrangement.79  In fact, in 
order to respect the sovereign equality of the threatened state, the UN and its 
members could act only to support the transition to ex-situ nationhood.80 
The overall structure of the trusteeship arrangement would first be as an 
interim body serving alongside the existing threatened state to facilitate a transition 
of sovereign functions.81  The decisions that these interim bodies (referred to as 
“Interim Missions”) could undertake specifically mentioned include: (1) 
determining appropriate modifications to the current in-situ political and economic 
institutions; (2) enacting legislation for the continued citizenship as well as 
distribution of monies from resource rents, adaptation funding, or compensation 
from other international entities; (3) resolving property disputes and appropriate 
regimes for compensation; and (4) developing a mechanism for determining what 
is in the best interests of a diaspora and representing the people in international 
affairs accordingly.82  This arrangement would continue for a period of time, but 
once “complete territorial dislocation” occurs, the interim body would combine 
with the dislocated governing body to form a single locus of power.83  This new 
body, now the central government of the nation ex-situ, would from that point 
coordinate all social, economic, and commercial matters related to its former 
territory for the benefit of its citizens.84  This arrangement, Professor Burkett 
 
 76. See generally Burkett, supra note 4. 
 77. Id. at 109. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 109. 
 80. Id. at 109, 110. 
 81. Burkett, supra note 4, at 110. 
 82. Id. at 111. 
 83. Id. at 112. 
 84. Id. 
 





writes, could continue to exist in perpetuity, but also notes that it could be subject 
to dissolution at any time via whatever voting procedures it chooses to use.85 
Even if Professor Burkett’s proposal for Nations “Ex-Situ” seem somewhat 
far-fetched in bestowing a sovereign character on non-territorial entities, there is 
both historical and current precedent to suggest that such a course of action is at 
least theoretically feasible as applied to small island states.  In October 1870, the 
Kingdom of Italy occupied the heretofore Papal-ruled city of Rome, culminating 
the process of unification of the Italian peninsula while ending the sovereignty of 
the Catholic Church over the city.86  At the same time however, this occupation 
began what was referred to as the “Roman Question” for the next sixty years, as 
the leaders of the Catholic Church beginning with Pope Pius IX remained in the 
Vatican as “prisoners” in protest of the move in an effort to avoid recognition of 
the authority of the Kingdom of Italy.87  As a result, the Pontiffs had no territorial 
jurisdiction over any territory for an almost sixty-year period.88  Despite the lack 
of territoriality however, the Holy See continued to exercise a certain degree of 
sovereignty and diplomacy independent of that from the Kingdom of Italy.  For 
example, the Vatican and the German Empire conducted an exchange of diplomats 
in 1882, and the Vatican assisted in the mediation of territorial disputes between 
Germany and Spain in 1885.89  Even the United States Supreme Court recognized 
this unique situation of the seat of the Roman Catholic Church, writing in 1908 that 
“[t]he Holy See still occupies a recognized position in international law, of which 
the courts must take judicial notice.”90 
However, this period of sovereign purgatory for the Vatican was resolved in 
1929 with the signing of the Lateran Pacts between the Kingdom of Italy and the 
Holy See.91  The Pacts established the full ownership and sovereignty of the 
Vatican under the Holy See and in “international matters as an inherent attribute in 
conformity with its traditions and the requirements of its mission to the world.”92  
As a result, even with a notional territory in the Vatican, the Holy See is a 
recognized actor in international law and is a party to various conventions in its 
own right, including the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child of 1989, and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.93 
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Even though the Holy See now exercises a degree of sovereignty over 
territory, there is also a contemporary example of a non-territorial sovereign entity 
engaged in international relations and exerting a sovereign personality: The 
Sovereign Military Order of Malta (SMOM).  In this case, the Sovereign Military 
Order of Malta arose originally as an extraterritorial hospital established outside of 
Jerusalem meant to treat Christian pilgrims,94 with the organization taking on more 
of a military air during the Crusades in the Middle East.95  Over time, it had moved 
from one part of the Mediterranean to another, eventually ending up on the island 
of Rhodes by the 14th century.96  By 1520, the Order settled on the island of 
Malta,97 where they remained until 1798, when they were ejected from the island 
by France.98   
Today, SMOM has its seat of government headquartered in Rome, where it 
is guaranteed extraterritorial rights.99  Since arriving in there in 1834, SMOM 
reverted back to its original mission of charity work and assisting those in times of 
war and other disasters.100  In addition, the Order notes that it maintains bilateral 
relations with over 107 states through accredited diplomatic missions,101 despite 
having no sovereign territory of its own.  Despite not having any “territory” per se, 
it maintains that it is made up of over 13,500 Knights, Dames, and Chaplains, along 
with 80,000 volunteers and 25,000 employees.102  In addition, while it is not a full 
member of the United Nations, it does maintain a permanent mission to the United 
Nations and was granted Observer Status in 1994.103 
However, while the Holy See and SMOM serve as potential examples of the 
continuity of “deterritorialized sovereign entities,” these examples have certain 
limitations that may prevent their effective application to the situations faced by 
threatened island states today.  First, while the entities themselves may be 
sovereign (or consider themselves so), there are practical restrictions as to how 
they express their sovereignty, particularly with regards to individual persons.  For 
instance, attaining citizenship in either the Holy See or SMOM does not necessarily 
fit within the traditional notions of how citizenship is determined.  Traditionally, 
one’s citizenship is determined by one of two factors, jus soli (citizenship 
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determined by one’s place of birth),104 or jus sanguinis (citizenship determined by 
the nationality of one’s parents).105  For obvious reasons, acquisition of citizenship 
by these methods are either highly impractical (for the Holy See), or outright 
impossible (in the case of SMOM).   
Despite the challenges of defining citizenship under typical norms, both the 
Holy See and the SMOM have been able to adapt to the peculiar natures of their 
sovereignties.  The Holy See does maintain a distinct citizenship, which it grants 
to people in three distinct situations: (1) by residents of the Vatican City State when 
they are authorized by reason of their office or service, (2) by the persons who have 
obtained papal authorization to reside in the State, independently of any other 
conditions, and (3) by the spouses and children of current citizens, who are also 
residents, of the Vatican City State.106  Conversely, SMOM does not appear to 
maintain its own distinct form of citizenship, but it does issue passports in limited 
cases “the members of the Sovereign Council (the government), to heads and 
members of its Diplomatic Missions (as well as their consort and minor children), 
and—with very few exceptions—to senior figures in charge of a special missions 
within the Order of Malta.”107  However, these passports are only meant to last up 
to four years and are otherwise limited by the duration of the passport holders’ 
assignment.108  Therefore, under these limited sets of circumstances, it does appear 
that some idea of citizenship could be retained by deterritorialized states.  
However, it should be noted that in the case of the Holy See and SMOM, none of 
the current citizenship holders and passport holders are not “born” or even 
“naturalized” into their deterritorialized citizenship.  Rather, they join at some later 
point by virtue of their positions within these sovereign entities without necessarily 
giving up their previous citizenship. 
It is this distinction on citizenship of the Holy See and SMOM where the 
idea of citizenship within the nation ex-situ becomes somewhat far-fetched.  
Professor Burkett advances the argument that the benefits of citizenship in the 
nation ex-situ still provides a valuable “psychosocial benefit” of the perpetuation 
of culture and lifeways indigenous to endangered states.109  She contends that even 
without a physical location, the sense of bonded community will continue to have 
a multi-generational relevance and strength, and that the nationals of an ex-situ 
nation can continue to enjoy a shared purpose.110  However, the existence of a non-
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territorial sovereign entity such as the nation ex-situ is by no means a prerequisite 
for a group of people to have a shared affinity for a common culture: people still 
don kilts and play bagpipes even though Scotland has not existed as an independent 
nation for over 300 years.  Furthermore, the idea that a nation’s culture can persist 
through the nation ex-situ in a geographically dispersed diaspora over many 
generations seems to ignore the possibility that such populations would not 
intermarry and integrate within a larger community.  
 
Territorial-Based Solutions for Threatened Island States 
While the concept of non-territorial statehood is being discussed as a 
potential solution to the island nations most threatened by climate change, other 
solutions have taken a different look at the situation.  The first and most obvious 
territorial-based solution for islands is the construction of artificial harbor works 
and structures to protect the land that makes up an island.111  This sort of 
construction can take one of two forms.  First, implementation of “hard” defenses, 
including seawalls, breakwaters, quays, or similar structures.  Second, use of “soft” 
protection measures such as beach nourishment112 or the artificial elevation of the 
island from material from the seabed.113  There are several examples of these 
activities already being carried out by island states to preserve their territorial 
integrity.   
Perhaps the most ambitious of these types of projects is the undertaking of 
land reclamation projects on already existing islands, with one of the largest 
examples being the island of Hulhumalé in the Maldives.114  This project, which 
began in 2002, is a planned city meant to address the congestion and housing issues 
in the capital of Malé.115  As of 2016, it already has a population of 40,000 
residents, but the ultimate goal of Hulhumalé is to eventually accommodate around 
240,000 residents, about two-thirds of the entire population of the country.116  
However, such development does not come cheap, as Phase II of the Hulhumalé 
development (along with a bridge to connect it to the capital) is estimated to cost 
around US$400 million.117  However, the costs of the project are expected to be 
recouped in part from the expansion of electricity generation on the island at lower 
costs, as well as the savings expected from the lower costs of government service 
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delivery.118  That being said, many of the expenses of these projects are being 
financed via loans from foreign countries and organizations.119 
Despite the risks inherent in seeking out a large number of loans from foreign 
governments and entities for this infrastructure development, one very important 
advantage of the construction of harbor works and other shoreline structures is that 
they preserve the territorial baselines for the purposes of defining a nation’s 
territorial sea under Article 11 of UNCLOS.120  With regards to other sorts of 
defensive structures, be it the “hard” or “soft” measures, there may be a general 
acceptance within international law that these sorts of defensive structures do allow 
the states constructing them to continue to maintain their territorial seas and EEZs 
based on such structures, even though they are “artificial” in a strict sense.121  This 
tacit acceptance of the ability of states to construct defensive measures on their 
coastlines to preserve their territorial integrity allows for solutions based on coastal 
works and land reclamation.  These solutions can serve as some of the more 
feasible forms of protecting an island nation’s sovereignty.  For example, the land 
reclamation of Hulhumalé would appear to fall into the category of preserving 
existing territorial seas and EEZs precisely because it is being done on an already 
existing island.  The same could be said of the other coastal defensive measures 
being undertaken by Maldives as a part of its “Safer Island Strategy.”122 
Another solution that was once seemingly science fiction has gained traction 
in recent years, to the point of serious consideration by at least one government in 
the Pacific region.  The creation of floating islands seeks to move away from the 
potentially negative effects of artificial land reclamation and would instead help 
preserve local populations by allowing them to remain in roughly the same area.  
In fact, the government of French Polynesia has already begun to take initial steps 
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of constructing floating islands in collaboration with the Seasteading Institute by 
signing a memorandum of understanding with them in January 2017.123  Under the 
terms of the Memorandum, the Seasteading Institute will study potential economic 
and environmental impacts, with the goal of eventually raising funds to construct 
three solar powered pilot platforms, measuring approximately 50 meters across.124  
While the idea of floating islands seems attractive at first glance, this solution 
does run into a series of financial and legal concerns.  First, prohibitive cost is an 
overriding issue.  The proposed French Polynesian pilot islands are estimated to 
cost anywhere from US$10 million to US$50 million.125  This range puts floating 
islands potentially out of reach of many of these other island nations, many of 
which are trying to address rising sea levels through other piecemeal projects in 
order to protect infrastructure that is already in place.126  Even for French 
Polynesia, the shift from natural islands to man-made structures would exact a high 
price on the nation, as even now, they continue to have billions of dollars in 
investment in tourist infrastructure on the island of Tahiti.127 
Furthermore, the prospect of floating islands would do nothing to address the 
impact of the loss of Exclusive Economic Zones through the submergence of island 
territory to become low-tide elevations.128  These floating islands would be unable 
to adopt the status of territorial islands, as per UNLCOS Article 60(8), which states 
that “Artificial Islands, installations and structures do not possess the status of 
islands.  They have no territorial seas of their own, and their presence does not 
affect the delimitation of the territorial sea, the EEZ, or the continental shelf.”129  
Therefore, the loss of a nation’s EEZ and source of revenue for the future would 
be irrevocably hampered by the transition from natural islands to artificial islands 
without amendments to UNCLOS to allow for such a situation, possibly to include 
a “locking in” of baselines used to measure territorial seas and preserving the 
territorial seas and EEZs for threatened island nations.130 
In fact, such an allowance for artificial islands would potentially further 
threaten the sovereignty and economic vitality of these island states.  If a nation 
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were to lose the outer edges of its territorial seas and EEZs due to the submergence 
of its outer islands, these waters would revert to the status of high seas (defined in 
UNCLOS as all parts of the sea not included in the EEZ, in the territorial sea or in 
the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic water of an archipelagic 
State).131  Once the status of waters is determined to be “high seas” that gives the 
right of all states (both coastal and landlocked) the freedom to construct “artificial 
islands and other installations permitted under international law . . . .”132  One only 
has to look to the spate of island-building in the South China Sea in recent years to 
see the deleterious effect of states constructing artificial islands from other 
geographic features in order to stake competing claims on resources under 
UNCLOS.133  So long as the ephemeral nature of maritime boundaries is allowed 
to continue under the current regime provided by UNCLOS, such disputes will 
have the potential to cause further conflict between sovereign states.134 
 
The Compact of Free Association as a Model for Preserving of Small 
Island Sovereignty 
The final proposal to address the issues faced by small island states could be 
described either as a new or an old solution.  It is “new” in the sense that it has not 
been seriously considered as a vehicle for addressing the aforementioned issues 
faced by small island states as a result of climate change.  However, it could also 
be considered “old” in that this solution draws upon an already existing series of 
agreements as a basis upon which to build a viable relationship between these 
threatened nations and larger, more developed nations to provide the necessary 
funding and other assistance that these nations will require in the years and decades 
to come.  This solution is in the form of the “Compacts of Free Association,” 
currently in force between the United States and three small Pacific island states—
the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the 
Republic of Palau. 
The political emergence of these states into independent and sovereign 
entities arose after the Second World War, when these islands were collectively 
administered by the United States as the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands 
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(TTPI).135  The United Nations Charter introduced the concept of trust territories, 
applying them to former League of Nations Mandates and territories “detached 
from ‘enemy States’ as a result of the Second World War” in order to “ensure, with 
due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, 
social, and educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection 
against abuses[.]”136  The TTPI was one of eleven different trust territories around 
the world placed into this type of administration.137  This arrangement was meant 
to be temporary in nature, and by the 1970s, the different districts making up the 
TTPI began to examine alternatives for future status, but were unable to come to a 
consensus on any one option.138  For example, while the Northern Marianas 
District voted to change their status to a United States Commonwealth in 1975 
(becoming the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands or CNMI), the 
remaining island groups began negotiations with the United States for their 
respective future statuses.139  These negotiations culminated in the Compacts of 
Free Association, which were approved by the United States Congress in 1984 for 
the Federated States of Micronesia and Marshall Islands,140 and approved vis a vis 
Palau in 1986.141  In 2004, the parties signed amendments to the Compacts 
regarding the Marshall Islands and Micronesia.142   
Several sections of the Compacts of Free Association lend well to adaptation 
to a future bilateral climate change mitigation agreement.143  One of the key 
benefits rendered to the Compact States is the disbursements of aid every year 
through “Annual Grant Assistance.”144  As of 2017, both the Marshall Islands and 
Micronesia continue to be recipients of this assistance through their respective 
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Compacts.145  For Micronesia, the amount of funding available through this annual 
grant assistance is set on a sliding scale, declining from US$76.2 million in Fiscal 
Year 2004, to US$62.6 million by Fiscal Year 2023.146  Conversely, for the 
Marshall Islands, the amount of funding available under Section 211 of the 
Compact is set on a sliding scale, decreasing over time from US$35.2 million in 
Fiscal Year 2004 to US$27.7 million by Fiscal Year 2023.147  The grant assistance 
for both nations “shall be used for assistance in education, health care, the 
environment, public sector capacity building, and private sector development, or 
for other areas as mutually agreed.”148   
Notably, the compacts stress that with regard to the environmental sector that 
grant assistance will be made available to “increase environmental protection; 
establish and manage conservation areas; engage in environmental infrastructure 
planning, design construction and operation, and to involve the citizens of the 
Republic of the Marshall Islands in the process of conserving their country’s 
natural resources.”149  However, while the explicit language of the Compacts 
themselves state that the annual grant assistance is to be prioritized for the 
education and health care sectors,150 any future amendments to the compact could 
both increase the actual amount of money disbursed in the annual grant assistance, 
along with a redirection of how the funds should best be prioritized.  Here, the 
language of the Compact, specifically with regard to environmental infrastructure 
planning and the desire to protect the Marshall Islands’ natural resources, suggests 
that increased infrastructure development to protect from sea level rise would help 
fulfill the goals set forth in the compact.  Such protective measures, funded by the 
grant assistance provisions of Section 211, would not only protect the country’s 
natural resources in terms of the islands themselves, but also help preserve the 
country’s long-term economic viability by helping to preserve sovereignty over the 
natural resources inherent in the country’s EEZ.  Given the ability to preserve these 
resources in the EEZ, further grant funding for Compact states could be seen almost 
 
 145.   It should be noted that although the financial aid given to Palau via the Compact 
formally ended in 2009, the United States continues to provide assistance to the country 
equal to the amounts granted in the previous Compact.  See Interior Department and Further 
Continuing Appropriations, Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No 111-88, §122(a), 123 Stat. 2931; 
see also Tanya Harris Joshua, United States Transmits $7.5 Million In Compact Grant 
Funding to the Republic of Palau, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR (Feb. 3, 2017), 
[https://perma.cc/NLK4-T6DE]. 
 146.   Compact of Free Association Amendments Act of 2003, Pub. L. No 108-188, § 
216, 117 Stat. 2720, 2775. 
 147.  Id. § 217. 
 148.  Id. § 211. 
 149.  Id. § 211(a)(5). 
 150.  Id. § 211(a). 




as an inevitability to maintain their national economies.  This is, of course, in lieu 
of further amendments to UNCLOS allowing for EEZs to be “locked” in place.151 
While such funding to the Compact States would undoubtedly have to be 
increased to fully adapt to and mitigate the effects of climate change on their 
territories, the continued annual funding to the Compact States by the United States 
since the 1980s provides a compelling precedent to continue such actions, 
particularly given that such treaties would allow for long-range funding 
commitments to be clearly defined by treaty.  In addition, while the current grant 
assistance to Micronesia and the Marshall Islands is scheduled to conclude in 2023, 
there is no reason that further funding could not be secured beyond that year (in 
some instances, the Compacts contain treaty provisions that continue on well past 
that year).152  The existing agreements provide grant assistance to the Compact 
States with the overarching goal of “[promoting] the economic advancement and 
budgetary self-reliance of its people, and in recognition of the special relationship 
that exists between the [Compact States] and the United States.”153  Thus, the 
prospect of additional assistance to the Compact States for infrastructure 
developments and other island hardening measures will allow these nations the 
opportunity to properly adapt to the realities brought about by climate change and 
sea level rise.  This grant assistance would not only recognize the special 
relationship that exists between the United States and the Compact States, but 
would also allow the United States to make meaningful contributions to help 
preserve the sovereign status of several of the states most threatened by climate 
change.  In light of the sheer costs associated with creating and maintaining the 
infrastructure required for these states to survive climate change, the funding that 
could potentially be earned via a formalized bilateral agreement cannot be 
understated. 
A further effect of the Compacts of Free Association is in the assistance 
rendered to these states in terms of defense and other forms of direct assistance 
given by the United States.  Section 311(a) of the Compact of Free Associations 
with Micronesia and the Marshall Islands obligates the United States to have the 
authority and responsibility for security and defense matters in or relating to the 
two countries.154  Besides the defense assistance offered to these nations, other 
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services offered by the United States government include the services and 
programs of the U.S. Weather Service, the U.S. Postal Service, the Federal 
Aviation Administration, the Department of Transportation, the Department of 
Homeland Security, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the 
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.155  Such defense responsibilities and other 
modes of governmental support can be a valuable asset for these countries, 
particularly with regards to protection and enforcement of their respective 
Exclusive Economic Zones.  These benefits accrued by the Compact States are 
both in terms of reducing the burdens of bearing the costs of their own militaries, 
as well as allowing for the functioning of a relatively efficient, well-developed 
bureaucracy that many newly independent countries face challenges developing. 
One further benefit that the Compacts provide to these nations that could 
potentially be integrated in future bilateral models is the favorable treatment given 
to nationals who wish to immigrate to the United States.  The Compact allows 
people from these states to “lawfully engage in occupations, and establish 
residence as a nonimmigrant in the United States and its territories and 
possessions” without regard to certain provisions of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act.156  Specifically, the Compacts provide this privilege to three 
categories of nationals from the Compact States: (1) persons who were formerly 
citizens of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, (2) persons who acquire 
citizens of one of the Compact States at birth on or after the effective date of their 
respective constitutions, or (3) immediate relatives of persons in the first and 
second categories, subject to certain conditions.157  This relaxation on immigration 
requirements for the Compact states is done “in furtherance of the special and 
unique relationship that exists” between the United States and the Compact 
States.158  As it relates to the potential for inclusion in future bilateral treaties to 
address climate change, the language of the compacts could (if amended further) 
provide an outlet to the issues faced by potential climate refugees who would need 
to evacuate from their homes due to rising sea levels, and even to immigrate to the 
U.S. if sea levels threaten to inundate these nations entirely.159 
However, while the Compacts do provide for a close relationship between 
the Compact States and the United States, it should be noted what these agreements 
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do to stress the sovereign and independent nature of the Compact States.  This is 
necessary, particularly in light of the potential criticisms lodged against the 
arrangement, including the idea that the current Compact of Free Association is a 
holdover from the colonial age.160  First, the Compacts explicitly provide that the 
relationship between the Compact States and the United States are governed by the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.161  While the Compacts have the 
United States provide for the defense of these countries (among the other 
aforementioned governmental services), it should be noted that the Compacts 
explicitly bestow upon the Compact States the right to conduct foreign relations 
and to have “the capacity to enter into, in its own name and right, treaties and other 
international agreements with governments and regional and international 
organizations.”162  Indeed, all three countries are represented in their own right at 
the United Nations as full member states.163  While the relationships between the 
United States and the Compact States are undoubtedly much closer than many 
other forms of bilateral relations, it needs to be stressed that the Compact States 
can and do maintain their nationhood and sovereign status among the other nations 
of the world.  However, because of the implementation of the Compacts of Free 
Association, these nations can continue to maintain their independence while 
getting the support for adaptation measures that they will undoubtedly require in 
the decades ahead, particularly if the Compacts do end up being amended to 
account for the new realities faced.  
After delving into the possibilities provided for by the Compacts, an obvious 
question that comes up revolves around the potential obligations that may already 
exist on the part of the more developed nations to enter into such compacts 
voluntarily with threatened island nations.  In the context of the threat posed by 
global climate change, it is perhaps more important than ever that the largest 
historical carbon emitters oblige themselves to assist threatened island states 
through bilateral structures based on the Compacts of Free Association.  While the 
current obligations of the United States to the Compact States is the product of 
legislation and is based on a history dating back to the Second World War, there is 
nothing to suggest that future obligations with respect to island resiliency measures 
cannot be found under the principles of environmental justice.  Considering the 
vast differential in carbon emissions between a country like the United States and 
a threatened island nation such as the Marshall Islands,164 future assistance to 
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threatened island nations serves to remedy the most deleterious aspects of much of 
the industrialized world’s carbon and greenhouse gas emissions, particularly in its 
effects on other nations.   
As a final note, it cannot be stressed enough that other developed nations 
besides the United States can and should seek to alleviate the effects of their carbon 
emissions on some of the most vulnerable nations through similar efforts.165  
Considering the threat posed by climate change on all nations, the institution of 
Compact-like agreements can provide a means for the most developed and 
industrialized nations to assist in the protection of the most threatened nations.  
While the main focus of this discussion has revolved around the relationship 
between the Compact States and the United States, that is not to say that these are 
the only countries which can use these types of agreements to address the issues of 
rising sea levels.  Besides the establishment of Compact-type treaties between 
developed nations and threatened island states based on historical and current 
carbon emissions, such treaties can also arise out of historical links not unlike the 
relationships between the United States and the Compact States.  Other countries 
with long-standing bilateral relationships with threatened island states can 
formulate similar agreements.  Some countries already have “free association” type 
relationships, such as between the Cook Islands166 and Niue167 with New Zealand.  
In the future, the basis for these types of treaties can come from other links based 
on shared language, culture, or historical relations.  The most expansive example 
could be the Commonwealth of Nations, composed of nations that were British 
colonies at one point, including some of the countries already discussed such as 
Tuvalu,168 Kiribati,169 and Maldives.170  While the Compacts of Free Association 
as they stand need not be the model which all threatened island nations use to help 
preserve their chances of survival, the idea of bilateral agreements established and 
strengthened through already existing links can help facilitate the development of 
similar agreements where none currently exist as of this time. 
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While the issue of climate change and rising sea levels is an issue that 
requires the attention of all nations, the need for action is perhaps most urgent 
among the small island states which face total submersion of their territories.  
Several ideas have been advanced as potential means of preserving the sovereignty 
of island states threatened by climate change, but none come across as the ideal 
solution without a compromise on cost, territorial preservation, cultural 
preservation, or ease of implementation.  However, on the balance, bilateral treaties 
based upon the model provided by the Compacts of Free Association provide one 
possibility that is worthy of further study.  While it is by no means the single 
solution to address the issues of threatened sovereignty, the compacts do provide a 
structure that can be emulated by other island states—and in the case of the three 
Compact States, amended to address the threats currently faced.  These treaties can 
provide a model in which several competing interests find compromise, including 
the preservation of small island states’ sovereignty and territoriality, the 
preservation of the local societies and cultures present in these island nations, and 
the prospects of preserving their national economic health.  Namely, it is the ability 
to directly impact island states to preserve their territoriality through the support 
and obligations imposed on larger nations.  The support of these nations can arise 
out of an increasing sense of obligation to smaller states in light of their historical 
carbon emissions, and specifically of the moral responsibility of larger nations to 
assist island nations in developing their infrastructure to survive the existential 
threat of sea level rise.  If such treaties could be enacted along with other solutions 
being discussed, such as a recalibration of Exclusive Economic Zones, such 
solutions can address many of the existential concerns faced by these nations.  
Compacts of Free Association-type treaties, while they cannot address all the 
issues brought about by climate change, do provide a measured, actionable 
response to the questions posed by these threats, and can provide one more answer 
to these larger questions of state sovereignty during these unprecedented times.  
 
